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INTRODUCTION—THE EVOLVING CONCEPT OF THE “FAMILY” IN CANADA
The social and legal concepts of “the family” in Canada have changed
dramatically over the past half century. While opposite-sex married
couples with children remain the most common family form, the 2006
Census revealed that these families are no longer the majority.1 The
divorce rate has risen dramatically over the past several decades, with more
than one in three marriages now ending in divorce.2 Consequently, singleparent families, blended families, and step-families are now common, and
there has been a substantial increase in the number of lone-parent families,
though most (approximately 80%) remain headed by women.3 Also, the
number of unmarried opposite-sex couples has been growing rapidly, rising
from about 6% of all Census families in 1981 to 16% in 2006, and Canada
now gives extensive legal recognition to non-marital cohabitation.4
Finally, over the past two decades there has been increasing legal and
social acceptance of same-sex relationships. As a result of litigation in the
late 1990s under section 15 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms (the equality rights provision),5 the federal Parliament and
provincial legislatures enacted legislation to recognize same-sex
relationships as similar to non-marital opposite-sex relationships, and in
2005, Canada became the third country in the world to legalize same-sex
marriage. About one in six of the same-sex couples identified in the 2006
Census were married, with the rest living in non-marital relationships.6
Like “family” and “spouse,” the concept of “parenthood” has also been
1. See THE VANIER INST. OF THE FAMILY, FAMILIES COUNT: PROFILING CANADA’S
FAMILIES IV 26 (2010) [hereinafter VANIER] (according to the 1981 Census, 55% of all
census families in Canada were married-couple families with children, but this number
dropped below the 50% mark in 1991 and fell again to 38.7% of all families in 2006,
with the result that this family type is “now less than the majority in all provinces and
territories”).
2. Id. at 44.
3. Id. at 26.
4. See, e.g., Kerr v. Baranow, [2011] 1 S.C.R. 269, 279 (Can.) (reviewing and
consolidating jurisprudence from the previous three decades that recognizes that
property claims must be protected if parties have cohabited and have undertaken a
“joint family venture”). Every Canadian jurisdiction except Quebec has legislation
which recognizes “spousal support” rights of unmarried partners. In Droit de le famille
102866, [2010] Q.A.C. 1978, para. 169 (Can. Que. C.A.), the Quebec Court of Appeal
held that the failure to enact such legislation in Quebec was a violation of section 15 of
the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. The Supreme Court heard the appeal in
this case on January 18, 2012.
5. Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982,
c. 11 (U.K.).
6. See VANIER, supra note 1, at 26; see also 2006 Census: Family Portrait:
Continuity and Change in Canadian Families and Households in 2006: National
CANADA
(Nov.
20,
2009)
Portrait:
Census
Families,
STATISTICS
http://www12.statcan.ca/census-recensement/2006/as-sa/97-553/p4-eng.cfm (reporting
that 16.2% of same-sex married couples had children and 7.5% of same-sex nonmarital cohabitants had children).
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transformed. In the latter part of the twentieth century, the legal concept of
“illegitimacy” was abolished and Canada gave legal recognition to
psychological parents, beginning with step-parents in traditional oppositesex marriages. More recently, the concept of parenthood has been
broadened to reflect the surge in the use of assisted reproductive
technologies (ARTs) by both homosexual and heterosexual couples to
conceive children.7 It is this changing definition of “parent” in Canada—
with a particular focus on some of the issues raised by ARTs—that is the
subject of this Article.
Our central theme is that, consistent with the relatively expansive
concept of “spouse,” in comparison to many other countries, Canadian
legislatures and courts have developed a relatively broad and child-focused
approach to the concept of “parent,” one that recognizes the importance of
social and psychological parents and now includes the same-sex partners of
lesbian biological mothers. However, Canadian law has not fully kept pace
with technological and social change, and there is a need for statutory
reform to better address the issues that are raised by the growing use and
sophistication of ARTs.8 Many questions related to ARTs have been left
for judges to resolve, or for lawyers to attempt to provide advice to clients,
in the absence of clear legislation or binding precedent. Further, present
laws significantly restrict the use of surrogacy agreements and payments to
gamete donors; while facially neutral, these laws have a disproportionate
impact on same-sex partners, especially lesbians.
This Article surveys some of the salient issues and controversies related
to the establishment of parent-child relationships in Canada, with a
particular focus on questions related to ARTs and same-sex parenting.
Given the complexity of these issues as well as space limitations, this
Article does not provide a detailed review of all of the relevant Canadian
7. See Introduction to Assisted Human Reproduction (AHR), HEALTH CANADA
(Feb. 1, 2008), http://www.hc-sc.gc.ca/hl-vs/reprod/hc-sc/index-eng.php (estimating
that up to one in eight Canadian couples experience infertility).
8. See Susan B. Boyd, Gendering Legal Parenthood: Bio-Genetic Ties,
Intentionality and Responsibility, 25 WINDSOR Y.B. ACCESS JUST. 63, 67 (2007); see
also Pratten v. British Columbia, [2011] B.C.S.C. 656, para. 330 (Can. B.C. Sup. Ct.)
(illustrating the law’s failure to keep pace with the new social realities created as a
result of the increasing use of ARTs, where a woman who had been conceived using
sperm from an anonymous donor successfully challenged various provisions of the
provincial adoption legislation and its associated regulations). The court found that the
impugned sections contravened section 15 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms since they mandated that information regarding the family history and
origins of adopted children be recorded and preserved, but did not extend these same
rights to donor offspring. Pratten, [2011] B.C.S.C. 656, para. 330. The British
Columbia Supreme Court also granted a permanent injunction to prevent the disposal
or destruction of Gamete Donor Records in the province. Id. For further discussion of
the issue of de-anonymization of sperm donors in Canada, see Angela Cameron,
Vanessa Gruben & Fiona Kelly, De-Anonymising Sperm Donors in Canada: Some
Doubts and Directions, 26 CAN. J. FAM. L. 95 (2010).
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case law and statutes, but rather, identifies central themes and discusses
particular jurisprudence and legislation that may serve as useful precedents
for other countries.
Part I of this Article examines the traditional legal bases for establishing
legal parentage, beginning with the historical legal presumptions which
privileged “biology and marriage when ordering and sanctioning
relationships.”9 Some of the current provincial legislation continues to rely
on these presumptions, and thus does not adequately address the new
familial models that arise out of reproductive technologies. Part I of the
Article also considers the expansion of the definition of “parenthood” in
Canada through the concepts of “standing in the place of a parent” and
adoption, with a particular focus on the applicability of these concepts to
cases where children are conceived by ARTs.10 Part II reviews the
Canadian legislation that has been enacted to address issues related to
ARTs, as well as the case law which has interpreted or constitutionally
challenged some of that legislation. As we discuss, Quebec has Canada’s
most comprehensive statutory regime, allowing for the use of informal
agreements to facilitate a “parental project” involving ARTs, while Alberta
has recently enacted a progressive statutory regime which explicitly gives
parental status to same-sex partners if children are conceived by the use of
ARTs. Part III examines Canadian cases where courts have had to address
ART issues without a relevant legislative framework. Where the provincial
governments have been slow to act, the courts have not infrequently filled
the gap by taking child-focused approaches that recognize the equality of
same-sex and opposite-sex partnerships, and have affirmed the possibility
of a child having two lesbian mothers and a biological father identified on
the child’s birth certificate.
The final section of the Article considers the desirability of change in the
legal regulation and accessibility of ARTs in Canada. We argue that there
is a clear need for better legislative direction, including clear statutory
recognition of same-sex parental partnerships and surrogacy agreements.
In order to provide greater certainty and to promote the welfare of children,
Canadian jurisdictions need statutory reform to better address the issues
being raised by the growing use of ARTs. For instance, the 2010 British
Columbia discussion paper on family law reform provides a useful set of
recommendations for that province and elsewhere.11 We maintain that
9. Roxanne Mykitiuk, Beyond Conception: Legal Determinations of Filiation in
the Context of Assisted Reproductive Technologies, 39 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 771, 774
(2001).
10. See Nicholas Bala, Who is a ‘Parent?’ ‘Standing in the Place of a Parent’ and
Section 5 of the Child Support Guidelines, in SPECIAL LECTURES 2006: FAMILY LAW
71, 76 (The Law Society of Upper Canada ed., 2007).
11. B.C., MINISTRY OF ATTORNEY GEN., JUSTICE SERV. BRANCH, CIVIL POLICY AND
LEGISLATION OFFICE, WHITE PAPER ON FAMILY RELATIONS ACT REFORM: PROPOSALS
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there must also be improved access to ARTs, by removing the prohibitions
on payments for gamete and embryo donation in the federal Assisted
Human Reproduction Act,12 and greater support for access to ARTs under
provincial health care plans.
By way of introduction, it is useful to briefly mention the complex
division of constitutional responsibility for family law issues in Canada.
The provinces have primary jurisdiction over most issues related to civil
status, including family law and the definition of “parent.” However,
pursuant to the Constitution Act, 1867,13 the federal Parliament has the
exclusive jurisdiction to make laws in relation to “marriage and divorce,”
including corollary relief provisions for support and custody under the
Divorce Act.14 Further, the federal government has exclusive jurisdiction
over criminal law, which includes the authority to restrict or prohibit a
range of practices related to ARTs and surrogacy.
I. TRADITIONAL BASES FOR PARENTHOOD IN CANADA
A. Historical Presumptions of Parentage Based on Birth and Marriage
Historically, it was presumed that “the act of giving birth necessarily
resulted in motherhood.”15 Prior to the development in the late twentieth
century of highly reliable DNA testing, paternity could not be as easily—or
conclusively—established as motherhood. As a result, the law developed a
set of presumptions to assign biological fatherhood. These rules were
premised on two ideas: first, that the “biological father of a child . . . [was]
most likely the man having sexual intercourse with the mother” at the time
of conception, and second, that “the man most likely to be having sexual
intercourse with the mother . . . [was] her husband.”16 Paternity was thus
largely determined according to a man’s relationship with the mother of the
child: if he was her husband, he was presumed to be the father of her child.
Though this presumption was rebuttable, prior to the advent of DNA
testing, it was very difficult for a married man to overcome in the absence
of any evidence that he had no sexual access to his wife around the likely

FOR A NEW FAMILY LAW ACT (2010). As discussed below, these proposals were
reflected in the Family Law Act, S.B.C. 2011, c. 25 (Can.), which has been enacted but
not proclaimed in force. See infra p. 558.
12. Assisted Human Reproduction Act, S.C. 2004, c. 2 (Can.).
13. Constitution Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3 (U.K.), reprinted in R.S.C. 1985,
app. II, no. 5 § 91 (Can.).
14. Divorce Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 3 (2d Supp.) (Can.).
15. Mykitiuk, supra note 9, at 778.
16. Fiona Kelly, Producing Paternity: The Role of Legal Fatherhood in
Maintaining the Traditional Family, 21 CAN. J. WOMEN & L. 315, 318 (2009)
[hereinafter Kelly, Producing Paternity].
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time of conception.17 If a child was born out of wedlock, there was
historically no presumption of paternity.
B. Standing in the Place of a Parent—Recognizing Psychological
Parenthood
For very limited purposes, such as allowing a survivor to make a tort
claim, the common law recognized circumstances in which a legal parentchild relationship could be found to exist based on the assumption of a
parental role. In other words, in very specific cases, the common law
accepted that a person could be found to be standing in loco parentis (Latin
for “in the place of a parent”) vis-à-vis a child. This legal recognition of
psychological parenthood was considerably extended in Canada in the 1968
Divorce Act, where for purposes of post-separation child support, custody,
and access, a “child of the marriage” was defined to include a child for
whom a spouse had stood in loco parentis.18 Starting in the 1970s,
Canadian courts also began to adopt a “best interests of the child” approach
to custody law, allowing persons who had cared for a child for a significant
period of time and whom the child had come to regard as parental figures—
psychological parents—to have custody of the child in cases where an
absent biological parent sought to regain custody of the child.19 When a
new Divorce Act20 was enacted in 1985, the Latin terminology was
replaced, with subsection 2(2) now specifying that a “child of the
marriage” refers to a child for whom a spouse “stands in the place of a
parent.”21 Provincial legislation that recognizes the legal concept of
psychological parenthood for such purposes as child support and
dependents’ relief claims after death has also been enacted.22
The Canadian courts have adopted a multi-factor approach to the
determination of whether a person has “stood in the place of a parent.” The
provision of economic support is necessary, but not sufficient; there must
also be a significant degree of care provided, as evidenced by such conduct
as “parent-like” participation in recreational, social, and familial activities,
17. Angela Campbell, Conceiving Parents Through Law, 21 INT’L J.L. POL’Y &
FAM. 242, 250 (2007).
18. Divorce Act, S.C. 1968, c. 24 (Can.).
19. See, e.g., Moores v. Feldstein, [1973] 3 O.R. 921 (Can. Ont. C.A.); King v.
Low, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 87 (Can.) (demonstrating that in terms of affording rights of
custody and access to psychological parents, Canada has taken a child-focused
approach).
20. Divorce Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 3 (2d Supp.) § 2(2) (Can.).
21. See Bala, supra note 10, at 76 (noting that this new language has taken on a
“considerably broader meaning” than its Latin antecedent and, consequently, social
parents in Canada have been accorded “broader rights and obligations than in any other
country in the world”).
22. See id.
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as well as the provision of nurturance, discipline, or direction. The nature
or existence of the child’s relationship with the absent biological parent is
also a relevant factor. Once the relationship of standing in the place of a
parent has been established, it cannot be terminated by the unilateral acts or
attitudes of the step-parent after separation.23
A finding that a psychological parent has “stood in the place of a parent”
may result in a child having three (or more) persons with significant
parental rights and obligations. While Canada’s Child Support Guidelines
(Guidelines) make clear that the child support obligations of a
psychological parent may be reduced if the biological parents are able to
adequately support the child, it is not uncommon after having divorced
from the biological parent for a step-parent—especially a step-father—to
be liable for the full amount of support under the Guidelines.24 Almost all
of the reported cases which have determined whether or not a person
“stood in the place of a parent” have involved opposite-sex partners,
typically with a step-father arguing that he did not have a child support
obligation after separation. However, despite its prevalence in the cases of
heterosexual families, the concept is also significant for same-sex partners.
For example, by the mid-1990s, it was accepted that after separation, the
lesbian partner of a child’s biological mother could have “parental” rights
and support obligations.25
The 2007 Alberta case of H. (D.W.) v. R. (D.J.) is illustrative of the
recent cases involving children conceived by ARTs to same-sex partners
and the significance given to the legal status of psychological parents.26
Two men who had been involved in a long-term relationship decided to
have children with a lesbian couple.27 It was agreed amongst the four of
them that one of the women would be impregnated with the sperm of one
of the men, and that a child would be conceived for each couple. The first
baby was given to the biological father and his partner and was raised in
their household.28 Thereafter, the men had primary custody of the child,
though the biological mother enjoyed regular visits.29 When the biological
23. E.g., Chartier v. Chartier, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 242 (Can.).
24. Federal Child Support Guidelines, SOR/1997-175, § 5 (Can.).
25. See Buist v. Greaves, [1997] O.J. No. 2646, para. 27 (Can. Ont. Ct. J.) (QL)

(ordering the non-biological mother to pay spousal support).
26. D.W.H. v. D.J.R., 2007 ABCA 57, para. 16 (Can. Alta. C.A.); see also D.W.H.
v. D.J.R., 2009 ABQB 438, para. 107 (Can. Alta. Q.B.) (affirming the appellant’s
application for access); D.W.H. v. D.J.R., 2011 ABQB 608, para. 1 (Can. Alta. Q.B.)
(invoking section 15 of the Charter to grant the partner of the biological father the
status of a “parent”). As of August 2011, the Alberta legislation was amended to deal
with this type of situation in a more child-focused way, but that legislation was not
retroactive; hence, this litigation occurred.
27. D.W.H., 2007 ABCA. 57, at para. 3.
28. Id.
29. Id. at para. 4.
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father and his partner eventually separated, the biological parents refused to
allow him to see the child.30 The former partner of the biological father
made an application for access, but the chambers judge refused to make the
order, giving effect to the wishes of the biological parents.31 The Alberta
Court of Appeal reversed the lower court’s decision on the basis that it
gave insufficient weight to the role of the former partner in the child’s life;
indeed, the Court noted that he had helped plan the conception, prepared
the home for the child’s birth, was present in the delivery room, and after
the child was born had participated in her care for three years.32 The Court
also found much evidence to indicate that he had “stood in the place of a
parent”—he had been in a relationship of some permanence with the
biological father at the time of the child’s birth and throughout most of her
life, and his actions had demonstrated a settled intention to act as a parent.33
The former partner’s HIV-positive status and his alleged poor choices in
his intimate relationships were not sufficient to conclude that his continued
relationship with the child was contrary to her best interests and thus, were
not enough to defeat his claim for access.34
C. Modern Statutory Presumptions of Paternity
Historically, children born out of wedlock in Canada—“illegitimate
children”—were subject to many forms of social and legal discrimination,
such as restrictions on their right to inherit property from their fathers. In
the 1970s and early 1980s, legislation and Charter-based litigation resulted
in the abolition of the concept of “illegitimacy” in Canadian law.35
Children are thus now entitled to the same legal treatment regardless of
whether their parents are married, cohabiting, living separate or never
cohabited. However, for the purposes of establishing a parent-child
relationship, the historical presumptions of maternity and paternity,36
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

Id. at para. 6.
See id.
Id. at para. 18.
Id.
Id. at para. 19.
See, e.g., SHEILA KIERAN, Farewell Filius Nullius, in THE FAMILY MATTERS:
TWO CENTURIES OF FAMILY LAW AND LIFE IN ONTARIO 131, 139 (1986).
36. For example, section 4 of the Nova Scotia Birth Registration Regulations
provides that “a woman who gives birth to a child must be recorded as the mother of
the child.” See Birth Registration Regulations, N.S. Reg. 390/2007, § 4 (Can.). The
presumptions related to paternity feature more frequently in the enabling legislation.
See, e.g., Family Relations Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 128, § 95 (Can.); Family Law Act,
S.A. 2003, c. F-4.5, § 8(1) (Can.); Children’s Law Act, S.S. 1997, c. C-8.2, § 45(1)
(Can.); Family Maintenance Act, S.M. c. F20, § 23 (Can.); Children’s Law Reform
Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.12, § 8 (Can.); Civil Code of Quebec, S.Q. 1991, c. 64, art. 525
(Can.); Family Services Act, S.N.B. 1980, c. F-2.2, § 103(1) (Can.); Child Status Act,
R.S.P.E.I. 1988, c. C-6, § 9(4) (Can.); Children’s Law Act, R.S.N.L. 1990, c. C-13, §
10(1) (Can.); Children’s Act, R.S.Y. 2002, c. 31, § 12(1) (Can.).
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modified to take account of non-marital cohabitation, have been
incorporated in some form into most provincial family law and birth
registration statutes. For example, in Ontario, the Children’s Law Reform
Act provides that a “male person” is presumed to be the “father” of a child
where:
•
•
•
•

•
•

he was married to the mother of the child at the time of birth;
he was married to the mother of the child but the marriage was
terminated within 300 days before the birth of the child by
reason of death, nullity or divorce;
he married the mother of the child following the child’s birth
and acknowledged that he is the child’s natural father;
he was cohabitating with the mother of the child “in a
relationship of some permanence” at the time the child was
born, or the child was born within 300 days after the parties had
ceased cohabitation;
he has certified the child’s birth, as the child’s father, under the
Vital Statistics Act or equivalent legislation in another
jurisdiction; or,
he was found by a “court of competent jurisdiction in Canada”
to be the child’s father.37

While these presumptions do serve some social and legal functions, the
increased use of ARTs and the legalization of same-sex relationships mean
that “presumptions about parenthood can no longer be drawn from the facts
of either birth or marriage.”38 Further, the development of DNA testing has
meant that a particular man’s biological paternity can now be proved—or
disproved—with a high degree of certainty, rendering “presumptions” of
paternity less significant.
With regards to motherhood, a woman who gives birth to a child should
not irrebuttably be accepted as the child’s mother, since artificial
reproduction has enabled the distribution of the “female biological
contribution among several women”;39 indeed, a child may have separate
genetic, gestational, and child-rearing mothers. In ART cases, the
historical presumption that assigns motherhood based solely on the fact of
having given birth may thus run contrary to the parties’ stated intentions in
arranging for conception, potentially burdening one woman with
responsibilities that she had not contemplated and denying another the
parental rights she had expected to receive.
The statutory presumptions of paternity can create difficulties for
families who have children through assisted reproduction. Consider the
situation of a lesbian couple who has conceived a child by means of
37. Children’s Law Reform Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. 12, § 8(1) (Can.).
38. Boyd, supra note 8, at 66.
39. Mykitiuk, supra note 9, at 793.
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artificial insemination. Although the women may have intended that the
non-biological partner be a co-parent to the child, the traditional
presumptions of paternity, unmodified in some of the current provincial
legislation, make no allowance for a woman’s female partner; rather, the
text of the provisions generally refer to “a male person” as being the child’s
other parent or “father.” The lack of gender-neutral language denies a
woman’s same-sex spouse the right to be regarded as a co-parent to the
child she helped plan and, indeed, meant to parent. Thus, the traditional
assumptions related to paternity offer such lesbian couples who are
attempting to start a family no basis on which “to establish a bond of
filiation between [the non-biological mother] and the child.”40
As will be discussed in more detail below, Canadian legislation and
jurisprudence have begun to address some of the issues that arise from
ARTs. It should be noted that the partner of a biological parent who is not
within the statutory definition of “parent” can still claim significant rights
as a parent by “standing in the place of a parent.” Thus, in the case of a
lesbian family, although the child will already have a biological mother and
father (perhaps a known sperm donor), if the mother’s same-sex partner has
assumed a parental role by financially supporting and caring for the child,
she may well be found to be “standing in the place of a parent.” Although
this would not give her full parental rights, were she to separate from her
partner she might be able to gain custody of or access to the child.41 Using
this approach, however, is not wholly satisfactory: relegating one intended
parent to a “parent-like status” rather than a fully recognized legal status of
parent may be considered unacceptable for partners who have together
embarked on the journey to parenthood even before conception.42
D. Adoption—An Evolving Institution and a Changing Concept of
Parenthood
Although the concept of adoption was not recognized at common law,43
by the nineteenth century legal arrangements were often made for the care
of children whose parents had died: wealthy orphans were typically
40. Robert Leckey, The Practices of Lesbian Mothers and Quebec’s Reforms, 23
CAN. J. WOMEN & L. 579, 585 (2011).
41. See Bala, supra note 10, at 56; see also, e.g., Buist v. Greaves, [1997] O.J. no.
2646, para. 23 (Can. Ont. Ct. J.) (noting how even before the acceptance of same-sex
marriage, Canadian courts recognized that the lesbian partner of a woman who
conceived a child through artificial insemination “should have parental status,
including the right to seek access or custody, and an obligation of child support” and
stating that the rationale for such recognition lay in the fact that the woman had
“clearly ‘demonstrated a settled intent’ to parent by providing consent to the
insemination”).
42. See generally Leckey, supra note 40.
43. THEODORE G. GIESBRECHT, Adoption, in CANADIAN CHILD WELFARE LAW:
CHILDREN, FAMILIES AND THE STATE 155, 155 (Nicholas Bala et al. eds., 2004).
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assigned a guardian to manage their assets and provide for their care, while
children of lesser means were placed in religious orphanages or were
“apprenticed out” to families who had them work from a young age on
farms or in family businesses.44 In Canada, provincial adoption laws were
enacted to find parents for “illegitimate children” (those born out of
wedlock) during and immediately after World War I when there was a
significant increase in the number of births to single women. Traditionally,
such adoptions were usually “shrouded in secrecy” as for the unwed mother
there was the harsh stigma associated with having borne a child out of
wedlock and, for the adoptive parents, there was shame attached to the
inability to produce biological children.45 Early adoptions resulted in the
complete severance of all ties to the biological relatives and the “rebirth” of
the child to the adoptive parents.46 To accomplish this, adoption records
were often sealed, and a new birth certificate was issued that identified the
adoptive parents as the biological parents.47 As a result, adult adoptees
who wanted to locate their biological relatives had no legal recourse, and
they faced many practical obstacles when they tried to do so by searching
old newspaper records, yearbooks, and other sources.48
Adoption in Canada has changed significantly over the past half century.
With the advent of improved birth control and relatively easy access to
abortion, as well the provision of social assistance to the mothers of
children born out of wedlock, since about 1970 there have been fewer
healthy newborn infants available for adoption in Canada than parents
willing to adopt them.49 This has given rise to changes in adoption patterns
in Canada, including the introduction of international adoption. With this
greater “demand” for children to adopt has come a willingness to give
greater rights to birth parents—indeed, it is now common to give birth
parents a role in the selection of adoptive parents, generally on an
anonymized basis. There is also a recognition that in some cases biological
parents can have a role in the lives of their children after adoption, thus
changing the concept of “parenthood” for both biological and adoptive
parents, as well as for adopted children. There has been a growing
acceptance of “open adoptions,” where the full legal rights and obligations
of parenthood are transferred to the adoptive parents, but there remains
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

Id.
Id. at 156.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 162 (noting that child welfare agencies often experience considerable
difficulty in finding adoptive parents for older or special needs children and so may be
“more willing to consider single persons and gay or lesbian partners for these ‘hard-toplace’ children,” since many of the “traditional adoptive parents” are loath to take such
children).
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some degree of contact with the birth parents,50 ranging from the provision
of an annual letter to fairly regular visits. While there is a clear need for
more research into the extent and effects of open adoption in Canada, the
practice appears to be fairly widespread within the realm of domestic
adoptions.51 Although there is great variation in the extent of post-adoption
contact with biological parents, there appear to be few problems with open
adoptions, with the arrangements giving the adoptive parents full legal
rights and responsibilities, and children having their psychological bonds
rooted in their adoptive families, but some contact with the biological
parents continuing.
A number of issues have arisen in the specific context of ARTs and
adoption. For instance, one problem that has had pronounced effects for
gay and lesbian couples who use ARTs is step-parent adoption. Canadian
statutes generally relax the requirements that govern the adoption of
children by relatives of a biological parent (like grandparents) or by the
“spouse” of a biological parent (traditionally, a step-father). Thus,
although ordinarily home studies, probationary periods, and the
involvement of a child welfare agency or licensee are necessary to screen a
potential adoptive parent, these requirements are generally waived in the
case of an adoption by a step-parent.52 Most step-parent adoptions occur in
situations where a biological father has had little to no involvement in a
child’s life, and consequently, the child has developed a close relationship
with his or her mother’s new husband.53
Until relatively recently, the definition of “spouse” contained in most
Canadian adoption legislation made it very difficult for same-sex partners
to adopt their spouses’ biological children. Typically, such cases involved
a child who had been conceived through the use of artificial insemination
and had lived with the biological mother and her partner since birth. The
inability of a woman to adopt the biological child of her partner was
addressed in the 1995 Ontario case of Re K.54 A group of lesbian partners
challenged the under-inclusiveness of the definition of “spouse” contained
in the Child and Family Services Act, which precluded them from using the
step-parent provisions to adopt their partners’ biological children.55 Nevins
J. deemed the exclusion to be an unconstitutional violation of section 15 of
the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms since it discriminated against
50. Child and Family Services Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C-11, §§ 153.1–153.6 (Can.).
51. See Charlene E. Miali & Karen March, Open Adoption as a Family Form:

Community Assessments and Social Support, 26 J. FAM. ISSUES 380 (2005), for one of
the few Canadian research articles on this subject.
52. GIESBRECHT, supra note 43, at 165.
53. Id. at 166.
54. Re K. (1995), 23 O.R. 3d 679 (Can. Ont. Ct. J.).
55. Id.
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the petitioners on the basis of their sexual orientation.56 The definition was
also found to be contrary to the best interests of the children.57 Legislation
in a number of provinces has now been amended to explicitly allow for
same-sex partners to have “relative” adoptions, and in other provinces this
has become an accepted practice based on the ruling in Re K.58
In light of the fact that it is now possible for the spouse of a biological
parent to adopt a child conceived through ARTs in order to assume full
parental status, another significant issue which has had ramifications for
same-sex couples and others who use these technologies relates to the
consent of the biological parent to an adoption. In all Canadian provinces,
the consent of every legal “parent” is required for a valid adoption, unless
there are strong reasons that would justify a court dispensing with
consent.59 However, in no Canadian jurisdiction does the definition of
“parent” for the purposes of consent to an adoption include a semen donor
who has provided no care for a child after birth.
The question of dispensing with the consent of a biological father who
acted as a semen donor may arise even where there was an intent to include
him in parenting the child, as occurred in the 2009 Ontario case of C (M.A.)
v. K (M.).60 The child at issue had been conceived through artificial
insemination with the sperm of a homosexual donor who was known by the
mother and her partner.61 After the child’s birth, the parties entered into a
written agreement respecting the care and support of the child.62 The
father, who had his own same-sex spouse, enjoyed regular access.63 As the
child grew, the father sought more access and consequently, relations
between the lesbian couple and the father deteriorated.64 When the child
was six years of age, the women decided that the biological mother’s
partner should adopt the child, so that she could enjoy the same rights as a
biological parent.65 The father refused to consent to the adoption.66 The
couple responded with an application to dispense with his consent, arguing
that their social position as lesbian parents rendered their need to have the
partner pronounced a legal parent more urgent than it would be for a

56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

Id.
Id.
Id.
GIESBRECHT, supra note 43, at 176.
M.A.C. v. M.K., 2009 ONCJ 18 (Can. Ont. Ct. J.).
Id. at para. 9.
Id. at para. 14.
Id. at para. 12.
Id. at para. 17.
Id. at para. 3.
Id. at para. 6.
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heterosexual couple.67 The father claimed that if the court allowed the
order, the applicants would marginalize him from his child’s life, and that
he would in effect be reduced to “little more than a friendly uncle.”68
The court denied the applicants’ request to dispense with the need for the
father’s consent, and hence refused the adoption. The judge found the
father to be a “loving, involved” parent, and noted that the agreement
specified that it had been the parties’ common intention that he would
remain an active participant in the child’s life.69 Cohen J. ruled that
adoption was not necessary to reinforce the non-biological mother’s
position as a parent, as the parties’ agreement already made clear that she
was a custodial parent.70 Finally, the judge determined that allowing the
adoption to proceed would be contrary to the child’s best interests: “the
effect would be to undermine [the child]’s sense of her place in the world,
her confidence in her experience of the world and her understanding of
who her family is.”71
II. RESPONDING TO ART—THE CHANGING DEFINITION OF “PARENT”
A. Provincial Legislative Reforms
1. Assisted Conception
A number of Canadian provinces have enacted legislation that directly
addresses some of the issues created by ARTs. While these statutes
represent important steps forward in recognizing the new parental
relationships that have developed as a result of these technologies, some
Canadian jurisdictions have yet to introduce such laws. Further, there are
significant deficiencies in much of the existing legislation, leaving lawyers
and judges to deal with these complex issues without adequate legislative
guidance.
In 1988, Newfoundland became the first province to enact family
legislation that directly addressed ARTs, with section 12 of the Children’s
Law Act outlining presumptions of parenthood where a child was

67. Id. at para. 7.
68. Id. at para. 6.
69. Id. This common intention was reflected not only in the parties’ written

agreement, but also in the couple’s decision to opt for a known sperm donor rather than
an anonymous one.
70. Id. at para. 29.
71. Id. at para. 64. Elaine Craig has argued that this case should be regarded as an
excellent example of the fact that the feminist and queer legal theories—often
portrayed as hostile and incompatible—can be reconciled, with the result that both
schools of thought can advance their respective projects and values. See Elaine Craig,
Converging Feminist and Queer Legal Theories, Family Feuds and Family Ties, 28
WINDSOR Y.B. ACCESS JUST. 209, 216-19 (2010).
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conceived by means of artificial insemination.72 The Children’s Law Act
only dealt with the issue of the insemination of a man’s female partner with
another man’s semen. It specifies that “a man” is to be “considered in law”
to be the “father” of a child that results from his wife or cohabiting
partner’s artificial insemination if he “consents in advance” to the
insemination.73 The Children’s Law Act also provides that a semen donor
who is not married to or cohabiting with a woman who is artificially
inseminated with his semen “is not in law the father of the resulting
child.”74
Legislation enacted in Prince Edward Island in 2008 also addressed
ARTs75 in a somewhat more progressive way than the earlier enacted law
in Newfoundland. Section 9(5) of the Child Status Act76 provides that “a
person” will be “presumed” to be the parent of a child born by means of
assisted conception if, at the time the mother was inseminated, he or she
was the spouse of, or was cohabitating in a conjugal relationship with the
mother.77 This presumption can be rebutted if it is shown that the person
did not consent in advance to the insemination and did not demonstrate a
settled intention to treat the child as his or her own after birth,78 or if the
person did not know that the child was created through assisted
conception.79 It is important to note that the Prince Edward Island statute
uses gender-inclusive language, enabling a birth mother’s male or female
partner to gain status as the child’s parent. However, the Child Status Act
fails to address situations where a genetic mother is intended to be the
parent of a child conceived through assisted conception, and the woman
who gives birth to the child is meant only to act as the gestational, or
surrogate, carrier. This legislation also only allows a child to have two
parents from the time of birth, thus failing to address situations that
commonly arise within the gay and lesbian community80—situations where
a child has two mothers (the biological mother and her spouse, who acts as
a co-parent) as well as a father (the known sperm donor).
In Alberta, the Family Law Act, which first came into force in 2005, (the
2005 Alberta Family Law Act), addressed artificial reproduction by means
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

Children’s Law Act, S. Nfld. 1988, c. 61, § 12 (Can.).
Id. § 12(3).
Children’s Law Act, R.S.N.L. 1990, c. C-13, § 12(6) (Can.).
See Child Status Act, R.S.P.E.I. 1988, c. C-6 (Can.).
Id.
Id. § 9(5).
Id. § 9(5)(a).
Id. § 9(5)(b).
Fiona Kelly, Nuclear Norms or Fluid Families? Incorporating Lesbian and
Gay Parents and Their Children into Canadian Family Law, 21 CAN. J. FAM. L. 133,
161 (2004).
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of a surrogate or gestational carrier, as well as artificial insemination. In its
earlier form, the statute was written in gender-specific terms, and without
reference to the possibility of same-sex partners becoming parents.
Thus, for example, section 13 of the 2005 Alberta Family Law Act
governed instances of “assisted conception,” defined as “the fertilization by
a male person’s sperm of a female person’s egg by means other than sexual
intercourse,” and included “fertilization of a female person’s egg outside of
her uterus and subsequent implantation of the fertilized egg into her
uterus.”81 Subsection 13(2) provided that a “male person” was deemed the
father of a child if, at the time of the assisted conception, he was the spouse
of, or was in “a relationship of interdependence of some permanence” with
the woman who was inseminated, and his sperm was used in the process.82
Where the man’s sperm was not used in the assisted conception, he was the
child’s legal father where it could be shown that he agreed in advance of
the conception to act as a parent to the ensuing child.83 The problem with
this provision was that if the biological mother was in a same-sex
relationship, her partner, although she may have consented in advance to
becoming a parent, was effectively excluded from attaining parental status
since the section applied only to a “male person.”84 The gender-specific
language of this provision was the subject of a constitutional challenge in
Fraess v. Alberta.85 The petitioner’s same-sex spouse had been artificially
inseminated with the sperm of an anonymous donor.86 She argued that the
impugned section conferred a “significant benefit” on heterosexual couples
while it forced lesbian spouses to “engage in a separate and protracted
process” of adoption in order to achieve parental status.87 Clarke J.
determined that the legislation violated the equality guarantee contained in
section 15 of the Charter.88 The court observed that this provision “makes
available the benefit of parental status only to male persons”—that is, a
person “married or partnered in [a] relationship of the opposite sex to the
biological mother.”89 The court declared that subsection 13(2) should be
read to provide that:
A person is the parent of the resulting child if at the time of an assisted
conception the person was the spouse of [or] in a relationship of
81. Child Status Act, R.S.P.E.I. 1988, c. C-6, § 13(1) (Can.).
82. See id. § 13(2)(a) (maintaining that this remains the case even where the man’s

sperm was mixed with that of another male person).
83. Id. § 13(2)(b).
84. Id.
85. 2005 ABQB 889 (Can. Alta. Q.B.).
86. Id. at para. 2.
87. Id. at para. 3.
88. Id. at para. 6.
89. Id. at para. 5.
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interdependence of some permanence with the female person and . . . the
person consented in advance of the conception to being a parent of the
resulting child.90

In response to this litigation and the development of new concepts, in
2011 the Alberta legislature enacted new legislation governing parental
relationships that arise from ARTs, using gender-neutral language and
recognizing both same and opposite-sex partners of parents who provide
embryos or human reproductive material. 91 Section 5.1 of the new Family
Law Act provides that “‘assisted reproduction’ means a method of
conceiving other than by sexual intercourse” and further specifies that, for
the purposes of the Act “if a child is born as a result of assisted
reproduction, the child’s conception is deemed to have occurred at the time
the procedure that resulted in the implantation of the human reproductive
material or embryo was performed.” With respect to the determination of
parentage, there is a presumption that, unless “the contrary is proven,” a
person who is “married to or in a conjugal relationship of interdependence
of some permanence with the birth mother at the time of the child’s
conception” has consented to the conception and is a legal parent of that
child.92 While this new legislation allows for voluntary surrogacy
agreements and uses concepts and terminology that recognize same-sex
parenting, it limits a child to having two legal parents (though it also
recognizes the possibility of non-parental guardianship with a more
restricted set of rights).
Like Alberta, Quebec has also enacted a comprehensive statutory regime
to govern ARTs. This legislation is generally respectful of familial
diversity, especially with regards to lesbian partners. This is not wholly
surprising since Quebec is, in many ways, North America’s most
progressive jurisdiction (and also has the highest tax rates); for example, in
1977 it was the first jurisdiction to prohibit discrimination based on sexual
orientation,93 and it has the widest access to public subsidized daycare on
this continent. In 2002, the Quebec Civil Code was amended94 to establish
Canada’s most comprehensive regime regarding ARTs, with Articles 538
through 542 now governing the filiation of children born through assisted
conception. Article 538 provides that a “parental project involving assisted
90. Id. at para. 16 (emphasis added).
91. Family Law Act, S.A. 2003, c. F-4.5, §§ 8.1, 8.2. For an explanation of the

new provisions, see Government of Alberta, Justice and Attorney General,
Amendments to the Family Law Act – What’s New? (Jan. 26, 2011),
http://justice.alberta.ca/programs_services/families/Documents/familyLawActAmendm
ents.pdf.
92. Family Law Act, § 8.1(6).
93. See generally Civil Code of Quebec, S.Q. 1977, c. 6 (Can.) (amending the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms).
94. Civil Code of Quebec, S.Q. 2002, c. 6, § 30 (Can.).
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procreation exists from the moment a person alone decides or spouses by
mutual consent decide . . . to resort to the genetic material of a person who
is not party to the parental project” in order to have a child.95 While parties
may have a written agreement, oral arrangements may also be made and
given legal effect.96 A person who contributes their genetic material for the
purpose of realizing a “third-party parental project does not create any bond
of filiation” with the resulting child;97 thus donors of semen and ova do not
become parents if they do not intend to have that status.
The Quebec regime gives clear parental status to a non-biological
intended parent. Article 539.1 specifically addresses the situation of
lesbian partners, providing that if “both parents are women, the rights and
obligations assigned by law to the father, insofar as they differ from the
mother’s, are assigned to the mother who did not give birth to the child.”98
The Quebec statute does not permit three persons to be legal parents, so
that a lesbian couple who chooses to have a child by a known donor must
decide whether the donor or the biological parent’s partner will be the other
parent.99 A man may contribute to a “parental project” for a couple who
wishes to have a child either by providing semen for artificial insemination,
or by means of sexual intercourse.100 However, if sexual intercourse is
used for the “parental project,” the man may seek a declaration of filiation
(parentage) from a court during the first year of the child’s life based on his
biological paternity; in this situation, the biological father will displace the
biological mother’s partner as the child’s other legal parent.101
The legislative framework in Quebec thus generally defers to the intent
of the parents involved at the time of conception when determining
parentage.102 However, Article 541 prohibits surrogacy agreements,
stipulating that “any agreement whereby a woman undertakes to procreate
or carry a child for another person is absolutely null.”103 This provision has
created problems for children who are the products of a surrogacy
agreement. In one Quebec case, an infertile couple found a woman willing
95. See Leckey, supra note 40, at 584, 591 (arguing that the lack of formality
necessary to give rise to a parental project finds “little support” in the practices of
lesbian parents, who are likely to carefully plan for the conception of a child and will
generally want a clear written agreement that sets out the expectations of a known
donor); see also Robert Leckey, Where the Parents Are of the Same Sex: Quebec’s
Reforms to Filiation, 23 INT’L J.L. POL’Y & FAM. 62 (2009).
96. Id.
97. Civil Code of Quebec, S.Q. 1991, c. 64, art. 538.2 (Can.).
98. Id. art. 539.1.
99. Id. art. 538.2.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Campbell, supra note 17, at 242, 260.
103. Civil Code of Quebec, S.Q. 1991, c. 64, art. 541 (Can.).
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to act as a surrogate in exchange for $20,000. She was subsequently
artificially inseminated with the man’s semen, and after the birth gave the
child up to the couple and surrendered all her legal rights regarding the
child. However, in the uncontested adoption proceeding, the judge refused
to allow the man’s wife to adopt the child, effectively leaving the child
with only one legal parent.104
Thus, while the Quebec regime is generally sensitive to the interests of
lesbian partners who wish to use ARTs, the prohibition on surrogacy
agreements may have a discriminatory effect on gay partners who want to
forge an agreement with a woman to have a child of which one of the men
is the biological father and which the same-sex partners plan to parent
together.
2. Birth Registration
A number of provinces have amended their vital statistics legislation to
enable persons other than the biological mother and father to be registered
as parents if the child was conceived through ART. Although the
information listed on a child’s birth certificate does not definitively
establish legal parentage, “[birth] certificates nevertheless provide
presumptive proof of parent-child relationships and are required for
numerous legal and social activities.”105 It is thus practically and legally
valuable for any person who intends to be a parent to be listed on the
child’s birth certificate.
In Ontario, subsection 2(2)2 of the Regulations to the Vital Statistics
Act, proclaimed in 2006, allows, in the context of assisted conception, a
child’s mother and “the other parent” of the child to certify the child’s
birth.106 This gender-neutral language was inserted as a result of a
constitutional challenge launched by four lesbian couples to the previous
version of the Regulations, which enabled only “the mother and the father”
to be registered as the parents of the child.107 In Rutherford v. Ontario
104. In the Matter of X - Adoption – 091, 2009 QCCQ 628, [2009] R.J.Q. 445 (Can.
Que. Youth Ct.); see also Born to Surrogate, Child Has No Legal Mother, Quebec
NEWS,
Mar.
11,
2009,
Judge
Rules,
CBC
http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/montreal/story/2009/03/11/mtl-surrogate-baby-quebec0311.html. However, for an example of cases where judges were more sympathetic to
the interests of children, see In the Matter of X - Adoption – 09184, 2009 QCCQ 9058,
[2009] R.J.Q. 2694 (Can. Que. Youth Ct.) (allowing an uncontested adoption to
proceed involving an altruistic surrogate who was the aunt of the woman seeking to
adopt); In the Matter of X - Adoption – 09367, (2009) [2010] R.D.F. 387 (Can. Que.
Youth Ct.) (noting that the surrogacy agreement was entered into in California, where
such agreements are legal).
105. Boyd, supra note 8, at 74.
106. R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 1094, § 2(2).2 (Can.); see, e.g., McDonagh v. Mahallati,
[2010] ONSC 4986, para. 13 (Can.) (listing the same-sex partner of the biological
mother as the child’s “other parent” on the registered Statement of Live Birth).
107. Vital Statistics Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. V.4 (Can.).
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(Deputy Registrar General),108 Rivard J. determined that this legislative
scheme discriminated against “lesbian co-mothers”—who could not be
registered on their children’s statement of live birth—on the basis of both
sex and sexual orientation, contrary to section 15 of the Canadian Charter
of Rights and Freedoms.109 He contrasted their situation with that of a nonbiological father whose spouse had conceived using artificial insemination:
the legislation enabled such a man to be registered as a parent on the
statement of live birth, whereas the applicants could not.110 Rivard J.
remarked that in light of the growing use of reproductive technologies, the
Vital Statistics Act was “clearly outdated,”111 as well as unconstitutional.
As noted above, the government of Ontario responded by amending the
birth registration regulations.
Nova Scotia also modified its Birth Registration Regulations in 2007 to
address issues raised by children “conceived as the result of assisted
conception.”112 If a biological mother is married, the registration of birth
“must indicate the mother’s spouse” as the child’s other parent, though this
includes a same-sex spouse.113 If the biological mother is not married, but
she acknowledges another “person” as the child’s parent and that “person”
files a declaration of intent “to assume the role of parent of the child,” the
birth certificate is to be registered indicating that other person as the child’s
other parent.114 This provision, phrased in gender-neutral terms, represents
a positive step forward:115 it enables a woman who has given birth to list
her same-sex partner on the child’s birth certificate as a co-parent. Section
5 of the Nova Scotia Birth Regulations governs situations of assisted
conception through surrogacy. Subsection 5(2) enables the “intended
parents” in a “surrogacy arrangement” to apply to a court for a “declaratory
order of parentage” if all of the following conditions are met: the surrogacy
arrangement was initiated by the intended parents; it was planned before
conception; the woman acting as the surrogate has no intention of acting as
the child’s parent; the intended parents intend to be the child’s parents; and
one of the intended parents has a genetic link to the child.116 This section
can be used by either a heterosexual or homosexual couple who have
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

Rutherford v. Ontario (2006), 81 O.R. 3d 81, para. 123 (Can. Ont. Sup. Ct. J.).
Id. at para. 104.
Id. at para. 113.
Id. at para. 31.
Birth Registration Regulations, N.S. Reg. 390/2007 (Can.).
Id. § 3(1).
Id. § 3(2).
See Mykitiuk, supra note 9, at 790 (arguing that the use of gender-neutral terms
should not be regarded as a positive reform; rather, that such language “treats parents
as fungible and risks marginalizing the gendered aspects of legal norms that continue to
influence legal reasoning”).
116. Birth Registration Regulations, N.S. Reg. 390/2007, § 5(2) (Can.).
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conceived by means of a surrogate mother.117
A number of other provinces, such as Manitoba118 and British
Columbia,119 amended their vital statistics laws to specifically acknowledge
that the “spouse” or unmarried cohabitant of the mother of a child who was
conceived as a result of artificial insemination with the consent of that
person is a parent. Although these laws now allow the lesbian partner of a
biological mother to be registered as a parent, they do not deal with more
complex issues related to ARTs.
B. Federal Legislation: The Assisted Human Reproduction Act120
By the late 1980s, there was great controversy in Canada about a range
of issues associated with ARTs and the fact that there was no legislation to
address them. The federal government responded by establishing the Royal
Commission on New Reproductive Technologies to address a range of
interrelated contentious issues.121 The analysis of the Royal Commission,
at least in part, “reflected most popular and academic feminist thinking in
Canada and the United States in the 1980s and early 1990s,”122 as well as
deep moral concerns about the commercialization of gamete donation, and
thus recommended a prohibition on payments to semen and ova donors.
The Commission’s Report was released in 1993 and eventually led to the
enactment of the federal Assisted Human Reproduction Act (AHR Act) in
2004.123 While the AHR Act does not purport to define who is to be
regarded as a legal parent of a child (since this is a matter of provincial
jurisdiction), it closely regulates some important aspects of ARTs, and so
warrants some consideration here. Overall, the AHR Act has had a
significant negative impact on those seeking to use ARTs in Canada, and a
disproportionate effect on lesbians who want to use artificial insemination.
117. Compare Family Law Act, S.A. 2003, c. F-4.5, § 12(5) (providing that a
genetic donor—defined as a woman who provides her eggs for fertilization—can apply
for an order declaring her to be the parent of the child; however, this cannot be said to
apply to a same-sex male couple, since regardless of which partner provided the genetic
material, neither could supply an egg for fertilization), with Birth Registration
Regulations, N.S. Reg. 390/2007, § 5(2) (Can.) (stipulating that the “intended parents,”
without reference to their sex or gametes, can apply for an order declaring them to be
the parents).
118. The Vital Statistics Act, R.S.M. 1987, c. V60, § 3(6) (Can.).
119. Vital Statistics Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 479, § 4, amended by S.B.C. 2002, c. 15
(Can.).
120. Assisted Human Reproduction Act, S.C. 2004, c. 2 (Can.).
121. ROYAL COMMISSION ON NEW REPRODUCTIVE TECH., PROCEED WITH CARE:
FINAL REPORT OF THE ROYAL COMMISSION ON NEW REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES,
Vol. 2 (1993).
122. Karen Busby & Delaney Vun, Revisiting The Handmaid’s Tale: Feminist
Theory Meets Empirical Research on Surrogate Mothers, 26 CAN. J. FAM. L. 13, 16–17
(2010).
123. Assisted Human Reproduction Act, S.C. 2004, c. 2 (Can.).
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The AHR Act opens with a set of declarations, including the statement
that “persons” who seek to make use of assisted reproductive technologies
are not to be discriminated against, including on the basis of sexual
orientation or marital status.124 Section 6 bans certain acts in relation to
surrogacy arrangements, including paying a female person to act as a
gestational carrier,125 accepting any form of payment or consideration for
arranging the services of a surrogate,126 and counseling or inducing a
female person to act as a surrogate mother where there is reason to believe
she is under twenty-one-years of age.127 The sale of gametes, embryos and
other reproductive material is prohibited for all purposes.128 Section 12
provides that donors of semen or ova can only be reimbursed for
“reasonable expenses” incurred as a result of their donation and specifies
that these amounts are to be governed by the regulations.129 No such
regulations have ever been proclaimed, making any payments to a donor at
best a questionable practice, but more likely illegal.
In 2007, the Attorney General of Quebec challenged the constitutionality
of much of the Reproduction Act, arguing that it trespassed on provincial
jurisdiction as set out in section 92 of the Constitution Act, 1867.130 The
Quebec Court of Appeal ruled in 2008 that most of the Reproduction Act
was ultra vires the jurisdiction of the federal government, since its primary
effect was the regulation of medical practice and research, matters that
come under the provincial heads of power.131 In December 2010, a badly
divided Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal of the Attorney
General of Canada in part,132 ruling that important portions of the
Reproduction Act were valid federal law. While a majority of the Court
accepted that some parts of the law were unconstitutional infringements on
the provincial power over health care, most importantly for present
purposes, it was also accepted that the prohibitions on payment were a
valid exercise of the federal power over the criminal law.133 Chief Justice
Beverley McLachlin wrote:
Parliament has a strong interest in ensuring that basic moral standards
govern the creation and destruction of life, as well as their impact on

124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.

Id. § 2(e).
Id. § 6(1).
Id. § 6(2)-(3).
Id. § 6(4).
Id. § 7.
Id. § 12.
Québec (Procureur général) c. Canada (Procureur général) (2008), 298 D.L.R.
(4th) 712 (Can. Que. C.A.).
131. Id.
132. See generally Assisted Human Reproduction Act, [2010] 3 S.C.R. 457 (Can.).
133. Id.
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persons like donors and mothers. Taken as a whole, the Act seeks to
divert serious damage to the fabric of our society by prohibiting practices
that tend to devalue human life and degrade participants.134

While the stated commitment to the health and well-being of women and
children,135 as well as the preservation of “the integrity of the human
genome,”136 are important and worthy objectives, there are very significant
concerns about the effects this statute has for those seeking to use ARTs—
particularly, the disproportionate effect it has on lesbians seeking artificial
insemination in Canada. In this vein, Canadian law professor Angela
Cameron has argued that the Reproduction Act has restricted “some of the
most prevalent forms of queer families.”137 Indeed, a central concern is
that the Reproduction Act appears to prohibit “at home self-insemination,”
which lesbian couples often choose to undertake using fresh semen from a
known donor.138 Like many scholars, Cameron also criticizes the
restrictions on surrogacy: the legislation specifies that those who need to
use the services of a surrogate mother can only provide her with those
“reasonable expenses” related to her pregnancy, which are to be more
precisely defined in the yet-to-be-proclaimed regulations.139 Consequently,
apart from relatively rare cases of altruistic surrogacy, Canadians who need
a surrogate are either forced to go to the United States or to other
jurisdictions where compensation is permitted, or are making payments to
surrogates in Canada that are leading to a “grey (or black) market.” These
agreements for payment are usually honored, but certainly are
unenforceable, and could in theory result in sanction if their existence
became known to the authorities.140 However, there are no reported cases
of prosecutions.
The prohibition on payments for semen has led to a severe shortage of
semen donors in Canada. A recent report prepared by an infertility doctor
for the federal agency responsible for artificial reproduction issues in
Canada estimated that there is a need for more than 5,500 donor sperm
inseminations a year—approximately 3,000 for lesbian couples, 1,300 for
single women and 1,200 for heterosexual couples.141 “Altruistic” Canadian
134.
135.
136.
137.

Id. at para. 61.
Assisted Human Reproduction Act, S.C. 2004, c. 2, § 2(a), (c) (Can.).
Id. § 2(g).
Angela Cameron, Regulating the Queer Family: The Assisted Human
Reproduction Act, 24 CAN. J. FAM. L. 101, 101 (2008).
138. Id.; see also Fiona Kelly, An Alternative Conception: The Legality of Home
Insemination under Canada’s Assisted Human Reproduction Act, 26 CAN. J. FAM. L.
149 (2010).
139. See Cameron, supra note 137, at 116.
140. See, e.g., Paid Surrogacy Driven Underground in Canada, CBC NEWS (May 2,
2007), http://www.cbc.ca/news/health/story/2007/05/01/surrogates-pay.html.
141. Tom Blackwell, Too Few Men Willing to Give Away Sperm: Study, THE NAT’L
POST, Mar. 1, 2011.
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donors are providing less than 10% of the required semen, leaving fertility
clinics to import (and of course pay for) frozen semen from the United
States to meet the needs of the vast majority of women seeking
insemination. While this type of purchase may not directly violate the
prohibition in the Reproduction Act that bans compensation to semen
donors in Canada, it does make a mockery of the concept of altruistic
donation and increases the cost and inconvenience for women seeking
artificial insemination. It also denies women access to fresh semen.
III. ARTS, PARENTHOOD AND THE COURTS
The existing Canadian statutory frameworks—even those that have been
recently amended—do not adequately address all of the issues related to
children conceived using ARTs. The ambiguity and incompleteness of
these legislative schemes has created challenges for lawyers advising
clients and for judges dealing with cases and who attempt to make
reasoned, fair judgments that take account not only of the parties’
intentions, but also the best interests of the child. The following survey of
Canadian cases on parenthood and ARTs examines how the courts, lacking
a proper legislative compass, have grappled with some of the difficult
questions that have been posed to them.
A. Opposite-Sex Partners as Parents
1. Single Mothers
The first reported Canadian cases that dealt with ART issues involved
opposite-sex parents where the woman was artificially inseminated. These
decisions illustrate a judicial reluctance to allow heterosexual women who
have conceived through artificial insemination while cohabiting with a
male partner to parent on their own, even if that was their original intent.142
Indeed, in some cases where there was no clear legislation governing
situations of assisted reproduction, the courts proved resistant to a woman’s
plans to parent independently, often resorting to the traditional
presumptions of paternity and related provisions to ‘find’ a father for the
child.
In the 1995 Ontario case of Zegota v. Zegota-Rzegocinski,143 a husband
and wife initially tried to conceive a child naturally, and then later through
artificial insemination with the husband’s sperm. After four years of
142. Kelly, Producing Paternity, supra note 16.
143. (1995), 10 R.F.L. 4th 384, paras. 2-3 (Can. Ont. Ct. J.). For a similar case, see

Low v. Low (1994), 114 D.L.R. 4th 709 (Can. Ont. Ct. J.) (holding that the husband of
a woman who conceived via artificial insemination through an anonymous sperm donor
is the legal father of the child even though the couple separated the day they brought
the baby home from the hospital).
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marriage, the woman eventually resorted to artificial insemination with
donor sperm, and after three years of trying, became pregnant.144 Although
the husband had consented to the procedures, there was evidence to suggest
that throughout the process he was less than supportive, at one point even
acknowledging that he “needed time to consider the fact that his wife
would be impregnated by the sperm of another man.”145 There was clearly
considerable tension in the relationship by the time of conception, due at
least in part to the stress of infertility, and the woman claimed that the
“marriage had failed and they were in fact separated” by the time of
conception.146 Indeed, the parties had been living in separate residences for
four months before the birth of the child.147 After the birth, the husband
visited the woman in the hospital and by the time the child was one year of
age, he was exercising regular access and paying child support pursuant to
an interim court order.148 In the divorce proceedings, the woman sought to
terminate her former husband’s access rights on the grounds that he was
not the child’s biological or legal parent.149 Relying on the traditional
presumptions of paternity contained in Ontario’s Children’s Law Reform
Act—legislation that does not have specific provisions dealing with the use
of ARTs—the court held that the man should be recognized as the child’s
legal father for all purposes.150 This outcome was contrary to the pre-natal
expectations and desires of the biological mother,151 and suggests that, in
the absence of legislation dealing with ARTs, the courts are likely to
operate on the presumption that a male partner who consents to the
insemination of a woman with whom he was residing at the time of
conception will be the legal father.
The 2007 Alberta Court of Appeal decision in Doe v. Alberta152 also
dealt with a woman who had conceived a child using ART and wanted to
144. See Zegota, 10 R.F.L. 4th 384 (explaining that the couple married in 1984,
entered an Artificial Insemination Programme in 1988, and the woman became
pregnant in 1991).
145. Id. at para. 14.
146. Id.
147. See id. at paras. 7, 16 (relating that the couple has separated in December 1991,
and the child was born in March 1992).
148. See id. at paras. 17, 24, 28 (describing the hospital visit by the husband along
with a Court Order granting him access to the child each Wednesday and noting that
monthly support payments began in October 1993).
149. See id. at paras. 10, 12 (noting that the wife took “the position that [the
husband] does not qualify as a “parent” as a matter of law).
150. See id. at paras. 36, 37 (ordering that the man be declared the father of the child
based on the statute which allows the court to do so where it finds a relationship
between the father and child exists).
151. See id. at para. 13 (relating that the husband did not sign the consent form for
the final procedure which resulted in the pregnancy).
152. See 2007 ABCA 50, Alta. L.R. 4th 14 (Can.) (stating that the woman lived with
a long-term lover who did not share her wish to have a baby).
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be a single parent. The woman had become pregnant through artificial
insemination with sperm from an anonymous donor.153 Her common-law
partner, though supportive of her goal of having children, did not want to
be a parent himself.154 Thus, the parties drafted a written agreement
pursuant to which the man was to be absolved of all parental
responsibilities and waived all parental rights; it was agreed that he would
not stand in the place of a parent, nor would he provide financially for the
child or assume any role as guardian.155 The Alberta Court of Appeal held
that the parties’ agreement was not enforceable, as it was not open to the
parties to waive the establishment of a parent-child relationship if the man
was living with the child and assumed the role of a person standing in the
place of a parent.156 Indeed, if the man demonstrated a “settled intention”
to treat the child as his own, he would become a person “standing in the
place of a parent,” and would thus assume the rights and responsibilities of
a father under provincial law.157 The Court made this ruling in spite of the
2005 Alberta Family Law Act’s parentage rules in situations of assisted
conception, under which the male partner of a woman who became
pregnant by artificial insemination by the semen of another man was
deemed the father only if he has “a relationship of interdependence with the
mother and a settled intention to parent” the child.158
The Canadian feminist commentator Fiona Kelly has contended that the
“thread” which connects the “seemingly contradictory” trends in the
governing statutes and cases is the courts’ desire to avoid fatherless
families.159 Judges will resort to the type of paternity—be it biological or
social—that can be made to fit the particular circumstances of a case in
order to impose a father on what would otherwise be a family headed by a
single mother, and thus “reduce the number of circumstances in which
children can become fatherless.”160 It should, however, be appreciated that
153. Id.
154. See id. (suggesting that if the man wished to continue the relationship, even

though he did not want to have a baby, he was still in support of the woman’s
decision).
155. Id.
156. See id. at para. 9 (upholding the lower court decision that the parent-child
relationship “cannot be ousted by even the most carefully drafted contract” (citation
omitted)).
157. See id. at para. 13 (implying that the partner’s position of permanence with the
mother could be interpreted as a “settled intention” to treat the child as his own).
158. Kelly, Producing Paternity, supra note 16, at 323-24. As discussed above, the
new Alberta Family Law Act, S.A. c F-4.5 came into effect on August 11, 2011. The
effect of the legislation has not changed in regards to this issue.
159. See id. at 317 (arguing that the courts do not express a clear preference for
biological or social fathers and inferring that that indicates a desire not to have
fatherless families).
160. Id. at 321 (suggesting that determining fatherhood is more difficult for courts
when there are competing social and biological fathers).
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Canadian courts have not forced women—particularly, lesbians—to have
fathers for their children.
Rather, women who arrange artificial
insemination by an anonymous donor or a known donor who is not
registered on the child’s birth certificate, and who do not cohabit with a
man who plays a parental role in the planning for conception or raising of
the child, are able to have fatherless children. While the courts will not
allow a woman who has in fact involved a man in planning for conception
or raising a child to exclude him from having a parental role, in coming to
this conclusion the courts focus on the interests of children, in terms of
both potential payors of child support and caregivers for children.
2. Surrogacy Agreements
Beyond the legal problems discussed above that are created by the
Canadian legislative prohibitions on payment for participation in ARTs or
surrogacy, Canadian couples who resort to surrogacy agreements to have a
child face significant difficulties in achieving legal recognition of these
arrangements. However, in the absence of clear legislative prohibitions on
surrogacy, as in Quebec, Canadian courts have been prepared to take a
child-focused approach to recognizing parentage in the context of
surrogacy agreements, at least where there is no evidence before the court
of any payment or other compensation.
In the 2003 British Columbia case of Rypkema v. British Columbia,161
the applicants were a married couple who had a child conceived in vitro
with the embryo implanted into a woman who had agreed to act as a
gestational carrier without any compensation. The couple signed an
agreement with the woman and her husband, making clear that it was
intended that the couple would have care of the child from birth and would
be the sole legal parents.162 However, the Director of Vital Statistics
refused to register the couple as the child’s birth parents as the female
applicant was not the birth mother.163 The intended parents brought an
application for an order declaring them to be the child’s parents, and sought
161. 2003 BCSC 1784 at paras. 6-7 233 D.L.R. 4th 760 (Can.). Compare J.C. v.
Manitoba, 2000 MBQB 173, 151 Man. R. 2d 268 (Can.) (dismissing an application to
presumptively declare that a woman who had her eggs implanted in a surrogate is the
biological mother of the child prior to the birth of the child), with J.R. v. L.H., [2002]
O.T.C. 764 (Can. Ont. Sup. Ct. J.) (holding that where the surrogate was just the
gestational mother and did not contribute genetic material the intended mother, though
not the birth mother, is entitled to be declared the biological mother of the child), and
W.J.A Q. v A.M.A., 2011 SKQB 317, [2011] S.J. No. 528 (Can. Sk. Q.B.) (holding
that two gay men should be recognized and registered as the parents of a child who was
born to a woman pursuant to a confidential “gestational carrier agreement”).
162. See Rypkema, 2003 BCSC 1784, at para. 6 (recounting the agreement between
the two couples where the surrogate “expressly consented to terminating and
renouncing any and all parental rights” and “further agreed to voluntarily recognize the
petitioners as the custodial parents of the child”).
163. Id. at para. 2.
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to have this reflected on the registration of birth.164 In granting the
requested order, Gray J. observed that including the applicants’ names on
the child’s birth registration was important in order to guarantee them a
meaningful and active role in the child’s life.165 Such a declaration would
provide them with “presumptive proof of their relationship to the child”
and would enable them to do such things as register the child in school and
obtain airline tickets and passports for him.166 The court noted that it was
significant that the case was not one in which it was asked “to determine
which of two or more claimants [was] the parent,”167 since both couples
had intended from the outset that the genetic parents would act as the
child’s legal parents, and the surrogate had agreed to relinquish the child
upon birth.
In contrast, the 2005 British Columbia case of H.L.W. v. J.C.T.168 dealt
with a surrogacy arrangement that resulted in contested litigation. A
couple without children advertised for a surrogate mother.169 A married
woman with four children answered the ad, and it was agreed by the
couple, the surrogate, and her husband that the woman would act as a
surrogate, and that the intended parents would cover all of the woman’s
pregnancy-related expenses, though no other compensation was to be
paid.170 The agreement was oral, and there were later disputes about the
exact terms, in particular about whether there was to be regular contact
between the surrogate and the child, or only an annual report.171 However,
in spite of these disagreements, it was anticipated that the surrogate would
consent to the adoption of the child by the intended parents.
The woman was artificially inseminated at her home with the intended
father’s semen. During the pregnancy, the intended parents gave the
woman several thousand dollars for what were claimed to be pregnancyrelated expenses.172 A few days before the expected birth, the surrogate
and her husband told the intended parents that they would need an
additional $8,500 for “post-partum expenses,” which caused a rift between

164. See id. at para. 3 (noting that a parent’s name on the birth certificate is
presumptive proof that the parents can use to avoid the adoption process).
165. Id. at para. 31
166. Id.
167. Id. at para. 30.
168. 2005 BCSC 1679 (Can.).
169. See id. at para. 4 (explaining that the surrogate contacted the couple after
finding the advertisement).
170. Id. at paras. 4-5.
171. See id. at paras. 4, 6 (detailing that the couples had exchanged a few e-mails
prior to meeting but aside from that correspondence, they could not remember the
terms of the agreement).
172. Id. at para. 9
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the two couples.173 Following the birth, the intended parents took the child
home from the hospital, and the genetic father and “surrogate” mother
(who was both the gestational and genetic mother) were listed as the child’s
parents on the registration of birth.174 Thereafter, the surrogate refused to
consent to the adoption, and brought an application for custody.175
At an interim hearing the judge implicitly determined that it was the
“best interests of the child” that should govern.176 While in British
Columbia there is a statutory presumption that a child born outside of
marriage will be placed in the guardianship of “the mother,” the court
eventually awarded sole interim custody to the intended parents and denied
the surrogate mother interim access.177 The judge placed particular weight
on the “pre-birth intentions regarding who would assume parental
responsibilities.”178 The fact that the intended parents had cared for the
child since birth was also important, since the court wanted to minimize the
number of disruptions in the child’s care pending trial.179 There is no
reported trial decision in this case, but it seems likely that after the interim
decision the parties settled the case on terms that would see the child living
with the intended parents, as they would have a strong continuity of care
argument by the time the case finally made it to trial. This case makes
clear that greater certainty and stability will be afforded for children if the
courts presumptively give effect to the intent of the parties at the time of
conception, even if the parties’ arrangement is one that violates the
provisions of the federal Reproduction Act. In a similar vein, all of the
above cases illustrate the difficulties created by not having legislation that
addresses the rights of parties involved in the conception of a child through
the use of ARTs. While statutes might not address every possible situation
that may arise, they can provide assistance to judges and lawyers dealing
with these difficult cases.
B. Same-Sex Partners as Parents
Until relatively recently, Canadian courts did not recognize some of the
special issues faced by lesbian couples.180 An example of this lack of
173. Id. at para. 10.
174. Id. at para. 2.
175. See id. at para. 17 (quoting the affidavit of the birth mother that “[she] will not

consent to the adoption by the defendant, J.T. My husband and I want to raise A.C.T.
ourselves”).
176. Id. at para. 20.
177. Id. at para. 40.
178. Boyd, supra note 8, at 79.
179. See H.L.W., 2005 BCSC 1679, at paras. 45-46 (explaining that it would be
better for the child if his caretakers were not changed before the trial so that if custody
was awarded to the surrogate mother, he would only have to be moved once).
180. This failure on the part of the courts to adequately acknowledge the unique
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acknowledgment was the 2005 Saskatchewan case of C. (P.) v. L. (S.),181
where a lesbian challenged the failure to afford lesbian partners of
biological mothers the same presumptive parental rights as male
heterosexual partners of biological mothers. The petitioner had been in a
committed same-sex relationship for six years with her partner, who had
two children from a previous heterosexual relationship.182 During the
course of their relationship, the petitioner’s partner had engaged in an act of
sexual intercourse with a male friend, and she had a third child as a
result.183 The two partners and the three children lived together for more
than two years after the birth of the child and then separated.184 The
petitioner sought a declaration of parentage for the third child and rights of
access to all of the children.185 The petitioner asserted that the child’s
conception and birth were the result of a deliberate plan of action to have a
child in their relationship, though by the time of the court application the
biological mother contended that the child was conceived as the result of an
“accidental and unplanned product of casual intimacy.”186
The petitioner launched a challenge to the presumptions of paternity
contained in section 45(1)(a) of the Saskatchewan Children’s Law Act,
which provides that a man is presumed to be the father of a child if he was
cohabitating with the mother at the time of birth or conception.187 The
petitioner argued that the failure to extend this presumption to a woman
who was cohabitating with a biological mother at the relevant time
constituted a violation of section 15 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms.188 In denying the petitioner’s challenge, Wilkinson J. held that
the presumption of paternity was not “based on societal stereotypes in the
ordinary sense,” but rather, was rooted simply in the assumption that “a
man and a woman cohabitating at a child’s conception or birth were

circumstances faced by planned lesbian families is likely the result of their noninclusion in the provincial legislation that governs the assignment of legal parentage.
For an empirical survey of these legal and social problems currently confronting such
family forms, see Fiona Kelly, Re(Forming) Parenthood: The Assignment of Legal
Parentage within Planned Lesbian Families, 40 OTTAWA L. REV. 185 (2008-2009) and
FIONA KELLY, TRANSFORMING LAW’S FAMILY: THE LEGAL RECOGNITION OF PLANNED
LESBIAN MOTHERHOOD (2011).
181. See 2005 SKQB 502, paras. 2, 24, 73 Sask. R. 127 (Can.) (explaining that the
law provides that a male living with a woman is presumed to be the father of the child,
but a lesbian partner is not).
182. See id. at para. 1 (stating that the couple had been together from December
1999 through January 2005).
183. Id.
184. See id. (noting that the third child was born in 2002).
185. Id. at paras. 2-3.
186. Id. at para. 1.
187. Children’s Law Act, S.S. 1997, c. C-8.2, § 45(1) (Can.).
188. C. (P.), 2005 SKQB 502 at para. 2.
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engaging in sexual intercourse.”189 Wilkinson J. also noted that the
petitioner’s application assumed that the legislation could enable a court to
find that a child (or children) had more than one mother, “an assumption
that is flawed.”190
This 2005 decision illustrates a judicial unwillingness to recognize the
evolving definitions of “family” and “parenthood.” Despite the fact that a
man in the same situation as the petitioner would have been presumptively
deemed the child’s father, the court ruled that it could not “aspire to affect
the fundamentals of biology that underlie the presumption purely in the
interests of equal treatment before the law.”191 At a time when more and
more same-sex couples are choosing to become parents, legislation which
continues to rely on “old legal assumptions that . . . parenthood is
congruent with birth or the fact that a man is married to or in a relationship
with a birth mother” remains untenable.192
Some more recent Canadian decisions have begun to acknowledge the
new realities created by lesbian and gay parenting and ARTs.193 As
discussed above, the court in the 2006 Ontario decision in Rutherford v.
Ontario (Deputy Registrar General)194 took a very different approach than
that in C. (P.) v. L. (S.), holding that a legislative scheme which did not
allow “lesbian co-mothers” to be registered on their children’s statement of
live birth discriminated on the basis of both sex and sexual orientation,
contrary to section 15 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.
Perhaps the most significant illustration of the wider recognition of gay
and lesbian parenting issues is the 2007 Ontario Court of Appeal decision
in A. (A.) v. B. (B.).195 When a lesbian couple who had been in a committed
relationship for over a decade decided to have a child, they turned to one of
their gay male friends, who agreed to act as a sperm donor.196 One woman
and the man became the biological parents of the child—who was born as a
result of artificial insemination in 2001—and were identified as such on the

189. Id. at para. 20.
190. See id. at para. 24 (observing that the petitioner assumed the statute would

allow a child to have more than one mother instead of challenging the statute for failing
to allow more than one mother).
191. Id. at para. 20.
192. Boyd, supra note 8, at 65.
193. See Donna Bouchard, The Three-Parent Decision: A Case Commentary on
A.A. v. B.B., 70 SASK. L. REV. 459, 474 (2007) (“A.A. v. B.B. stretches the notions of
family and of parent.”).
194. See (2006), 81 O.R. 3d 81, paras. 232-33 (Can. Ont. Sup. Ct. J.) (finding that
there is a pre-existing disadvantage for lesbian mothers and that registration on a
child’s birth certificate is a core dignity).
195. 2007 ONCA 2, 83 O.R. 3d 561 (Can.).
196. See id. at para. 1 (explaining that the couple had been together since 1990 and
decided to have a baby in 1999).
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child’s birth certificate.197 It had been agreed from the outset by all three
parties that the women would serve as the child’s primary caregivers, but
that the man would remain an active participant in the child’s life.198 With
the support of the biological parents, when the child was two years old the
partner of the biological mother made an application to the court for a
declaration that, in addition to the biological parents, she was also a full
legal parent.199 She chose to pursue her parental rights via the route of a
court declaration of parentage because if she had sought instead to adopt
the child, this would have required the father to forfeit his parental rights as
the child’s father, something none of the parties wanted or intended.200
Although the trial judge recognized that making the declaration would be
in the child’s best interests, he felt constrained by the legislation.201
Subsection 4(1) of the Ontario Children’s Law Reform Act specified that
any person having an interest in a child could apply for a declaration that
they be recognized in law as “the father” or “the mother” of a child.202 The
use of the definite article “the” was held by Aston J. to be indicative of the
legislature’s intent—that is, that a child was to have only two parents, one
mother and one father: “When the legislation uses a word such as ‘the,’ it is
presumed to do so precisely and for a purpose. It represents a choice of the
definite article over the indefinite article. Considerable weight must be
given to its clear and ordinary meaning.”203
This conclusion illustrates the deficiencies in much of the current
Canadian legislation: this restrictive language denied parental status to a
mother who participated in planning the child’s conception, and provided
primary care from the moment of birth. The Ontario Court of Appeal
overturned the trial judge’s decision, holding that it was contrary to the
child’s best interests to deprive him of the “legal recognition of parentage
of one of his mothers.”204 Writing for the Court, Rosenberg J.A. stressed
197. A.A. v. B.B. (2003) 38 R.F.L. 5th 1, paras. 1, 4-5 (Can. Ont. Sup. Ct. J.).
198. Id. at para. 4.
199. See id. at para. 1 (noting that the applicant asked specifically to be declared a

“mother” of the child).
200. See id. at para. 14 (explaining that adoption procedures require the court to
terminate the rights of one parent in order to declare another person the parent).
201. See id. at para. 40 (stating that “the court is unable to repair any legislative
shortcoming through parens patriae).
202. Children’s Law Reform Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.12, § 4(1) (Can.) (emphasis
added).
203. A.A., 38 R.F.L. 5th 1, at para. 34.
204. A.A. v. B.B., 2007 ONCA 2, para. 37, 83 O.R. 3d 561 (Can.). As discussed in
this decision, superior courts in Canada, the United Kingdom, and some other
Commonwealth countries have an inherent parens patriae—Latin for “parent of the
country”—jurisdiction to make orders that advance the best interests of children in
situations where there is a “legislative gap.” Unlike those situations where there is a
constitutional challenge, when exercising its parens patriae power a court clearly
cannot override an explicit legislative provision, but only has a narrow power to “fill in
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the existence of a “gap” in the legislation and noted that the provision no
longer accorded with modern social and familial realities:
Present social conditions and attitudes have changed. Advances in our
appreciation of the value of other types of relationships and in the
science of reproductive technology have created gaps in the CLRA’s
legislative scheme. Because of these changes the parents of a child can
be two women or two men. They are as much the child’s parents as
adopting parents or “natural” parents. The CLRA, however, does not
recognize these forms of parenting and thus the children of these
relationships are deprived of the equality of status that declarations of
parentage provide.205

The Court allowed the appeal and issued a declaration, pursuant to its
parens patriae jurisdiction, that the partner of the biological mother was
also the child’s legal mother, thus recognizing three legal parents for the
child.206 The decision of the Court of Appeal is indicative of a progressive,
child-focused judicial response to issues related to parenthood and ARTs;
the Court developed a creative solution to address the limitations of
outdated legislation in an effort to ensure that non-traditional families are
accorded the same rights as traditional, heterosexual families.
CONCLUSION: ARTS—IMPROVING REGULATION AND ACCESS
Canada has always had diverse family forms, but until relatively recently
only the traditional, heterosexual marriage was considered worthy of social
or legal recognition. Today, there is an increasing diversity of family
forms as well as greater visibility for those such as same-sex partners who
may have previously been more secretive about their relationships.
Canadian law has extended its legal recognition of adult relationships to
include same-sex marriage and non-marital cohabitation, and has
recognized psychological parentage. There is also a growing acceptance of
the legal significance of same-sex parental partners and the use of ARTs to
assist in procreation. However, the law has not kept pace with changes in
social behavior and the changing nature of ARTs. Consequently, all
jurisdictions in Canada should undertake a review of their legislation
governing parentage and children conceived by ARTs.
Parents and children should not be put to the expense of having to
litigate to establish recognition of their relationships. Rather, there should
be a legal structure that reflects the psychological realities of children’s
lives and takes adequate account of the intentions of those individuals who
the gaps” of legislation.
205. Id. at para. 35.
206. See id. at para. 37 (explaining that because it is not in the best interests of the
child to have one of the women raising him not recognized as his legal mother, the
court may fix the discrepancy though parens patrae jurisdiction).
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are using ARTs to conceive such children. The availability of appropriate
legislative guidance is vitally important for those using ARTs, the children
who are conceived in this manner, and the medical and legal professionals
who work with these families.
In response to these concerns, in July 2010 the government of British
Columbia released its White Paper on Family Relations Act Reform (White
Paper).207 This document has provided important guidance for reform in
that province, as well as useful guidance for reform elsewhere in Canada.
The recommendations set out in the White Paper provide that where
assisted conception is used—with the exception of surrogacy—the birth
mother’s opposite-sex or same-sex spouse, whether or not they are married,
is presumed to be the child’s other parent, a presumption that may be
rebutted if the partner did not consent to insemination.208 The White Paper
also provides that third-party donors of eggs, sperm, or an embryo are not
to be considered parents solely by virtue of their donation.209 However,
where assisted conception is used, a child may have more than two legal
parents if the parties involved all agree and set out their intentions in
writing prior to the assisted conception.210 Further, surrogacy agreements
are to be given legal recognition, though they are not to be fully
enforceable.211 For example, while a birth mother who has agreed to act as
a surrogate is not to be required to relinquish her status as the child’s parent
to the intended parent(s) based only on an agreement made prior to the
birth of the child, if after birth she provides the intended parent(s) with her
written consent, effectively turning over parentage of the child to the
intended parent(s), and the intended parent(s) take the child into their care,
then the parentage of the intended parents will be established. In
November 2011, the proposals in the White Paper were enacted by the
legislature in British Columbia,212 though the new law has not been
proclaimed in force, and at the time of writing, no date had been set for the
legislation to come into effect.
While this Article has focused on legal issues related to parentage and
the regulation of ARTs, often the most significant issues facing individuals
who wish to conceive children using ARTs concern access to services and
to the human gametes and embryos needed for ARTs. Indeed, in Canada,
207. B.C., MINISTRY OF ATTORNEY GEN., JUSTICE SERV. BRANCH, CIVIL POLICY AND
LEGISLATION OFFICE, WHITE PAPER ON FAMILY RELATIONS ACT REFORM: PROPOSALS
FOR A NEW FAMILY LAW ACT (2010) at 10.
208. Id. at 36.
209. Id. at 86.
210. See id. at 55 (explaining that one of the problems with presuming that donors
are also parents could mean that they would be required to pay child support when it
was never intended by the terms of the agreement for them to do so).
211. Id. at 86.
212. British Columbia Family Law Act, S.B.C. 2011, c. 25. §§ 23-33.
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the greatest legal impediment to accessing ARTs is the prohibition in the
Reproduction Act on payments to gamete donors, which has the effect of
dramatically reducing domestic supply. As mentioned above, this has
resulted in the importation of frozen semen (at considerable cost) as well as
the denial of ready access to fresh semen, which some believe is preferable
for artificial insemination.213 Wealthy couples and individuals seeking to
use ARTs or surrogacy can overcome these impediments by engaging in
‘reproductive tourism’—that is, going to other countries, such as the United
States, where surrogacy and other practices are legal and available, for a
price.
Assisted reproductive technology needs to be regulated to ensure that
high quality services are being provided, and to prevent exploitation and
protect the interests of children. However, Canada’s current ban on
payments does not meet the needs of either those wishing to use ARTs or
those who may be willing to act as donors albeit with suitable
compensation. Canada should adopt a system that allows for payments to
gamete and embryo donors, particularly for ova donors who must endure
considerable inconvenience, as well as some medical risk and discomfort
upon donation. The arguments in favor of permitting some form of
payment are even stronger in the case of surrogate mothers who experience
more serious risks, discomfort and income loss. The examples offered by
other jurisdictions—like some American states—that allow for payments
clearly indicate that it is possible to balance concerns about preventing
exploitation while at the same time encouraging donations by providing for
reasonable compensation.214
Finally, although all residents of Canada have access to government
funded “medically necessary” health treatment without charge, until
recently ARTs have not been regarded as “medically necessary” anywhere
in Canada, and in most provinces individuals are still required to pay the
considerable costs associated with ARTs. However, beginning in August
2010 in Quebec, the provincial government began to cover the costs to
enable infertile Quebec couples to have up to three IVF treatment cycles
including egg harvesting, in-vitro fertilization, pre-implant genetic testing,
embryo transfer and sperm sample collection.215 Additionally, single
213. There is some lingering controversy over whether impregnation rates are higher
and birth defects lower with fresh semen. See, e.g., H. Yavetz et al., The Efficiency of
Cryopreserved Semen versus Fresh Semen for In Vitro Fertilization/Embryo Transfer,
8 J. ASSISTED REPROD. & GENETICS 145 (1990).
214. For a review of some experiences involving payments to surrogate mothers and
a detailed argument in favor of allowing this in Canada, see Busby & Vun, supra note
122.
215. Robin Hilborn, Provincial Help for the Infertile in Canada—Free IVF in
Québec; Tax Help in Manitoba; Ontario Balks, FERTILITY HELPER (Sept. 16, 2010),
http://www.familyhelper.net/iy/news/100917quebecivf.html.
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women and lesbian couples in that province can now get sperm
insemination fully paid for by the government.216 Most other Canadian
provinces, by contrast, do not typically cover the costs associated with most
assisted reproduction treatments.217
For example, in Ontario the
government will pay for three in-vitro fertilization cycles only if a woman
has both fallopian tubes blocked.218 Although in 2009 a governmentappointed panel called for increased government support for ARTs, Ontario
has yet to act on these recommendations.219 While in some places in
Canada there are charitable organizations that provide some limited
assistance to infertile couples seeking medical treatment, too often costly
ART treatments are unaffordable.220 Canada’s publicly-funded health care
system is under considerable financial stress, and so there should be limits
on government funding for ART for infertile couples where there is a low
probability of a successful birth.
However, Canadian provincial
governments should at least provide some financial support and improve
accessibility for those seeking medical involvement to conceive a child,
especially for the relatively inexpensive processes involved in the artificial
insemination of women without male partners, which involve lower cost
and risk than other ART processes such as in vitro fertilization and embryo
transfers.

216. Id.
217. See id. (noting that other provinces do not have the funding to provide serves

for the infertile).
218. Id.
219. ONT.,
MINISTRY OF
CHILDREN &
YOUTH SERVS.,
RAISING
EXPECTATIONS: RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE EXPERT PANEL ON INFERTILITY AND
ADOPTION (2009).
220. A controversial recent Canadian response to the high cost of infertility
treatment in Canada was a “win-a-baby” contest, sponsored by an Ottawa radio station,
which offered $35,000 worth of treatment to five couples, who were required to write
letters explaining why they wanted the treatment. See, e.g., Paul Townsend, Contest
Offers Life Altering Medical Procedure, OTTAWA CITIZEN, Oct. 17, 2011,
http://www.ottawacitizen.com/health/Contest+offers+life+altering+medical+procedure/
5560852/story.html.
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